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Legislation	that	is,	and	is	not:	the	deeply
problematic	Repeal	Bill
The	(no	longer	‘Great’)	Repeal	Bill	has	been	published,	and	is	likely	to	encounter	considerable
opposition	in	both	Parliament	and	the	devolved	assemblies.	Joelle	Grogan	says	that	the	Bill
marks	a	move	away	from	individual	rights	and	remedies	and	offers	nothing	to	allay	concerns
about	ministers’	ability	to	amend	laws	without	parliamentary	scrutiny	(Henry	VIII	clauses).	It	will
be	up	to	them	to	decide	what	‘deficiencies’	in	EU	law	need	a	remedy.	The	sheer	volume	of
statutory	instruments	will	demand	a	lot	of	vigilance	from	MPs	and	peers.
In	two	earlier	posts	on	LSE	Brexit,	I	highlighted	concerns	regarding	the	potential	consequences	of	the	Great
Repeal	Bill	White	Paper.	In	the	five	weeks	since,	there’s	been	a	General	Election,	a	hung	parliament,	a	billion-
pound	deal	for	a	minority	government	now	facing	a	legal	challenge,	a	much	delayed	Queen’s	Speech	promising	a
repeal	bill	(though	no	longer	a	great	one),	and	finally	–	over	a	year	after	the	referendum	–	the	European	Union
(Withdrawal)	Bill	(‘Repeal	Bill’)	aiming	to	solve	all	the	issues	of	the	separation	of	the	UK	from	the	EU	presented	to
the	Parliament.
Much	has	been	made	of	the	Bill,	and	in	14	pages	and	19	sections	it	promises	to	radically	change	the	foundations
of	the	UK	legal	system.	It	will	repeal	the	European	Communities	Act	1972	(ECA	1972)	on	‘Exit	Day’;	it	will	‘save
EU-derived	domestic	legislation’	through	incorporation;	it	will	save	rights	and	not	save	them;	retained	EU	law	will
be	supreme	and	not	supreme;	and	a	Minister	of	the	Crown	may	by	regulation	deal	with	all	possible	present	or
future	‘deficiencies’	in	the	law	arising	from	Brexit.
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The	Repeal	Bill	is	designed	to	deliver	both	the	legal	separation	of	the	UK	from	the	EU,	but	also	a	degree	of	legal
certainty	to	individuals	and	businesses	following	Brexit.	However,	in	effect,	it	compromises	both	and	achieves
neither.
Henry	VIII	to	deal	with	the	deficiencies
In	a	way	that	broadly	echoes	the	ever-changing	descriptions	of	Brexit,	the	Repeal	Bill	has	introduced	new
terminology	for	delegated	powers	to	change	all	retained	EU	law.	The	language	of	correction	used	by	the	White
Paper	has	been	replaced	by	‘dealing	with	deficiencies’.	Section	7	states	that
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‘A	Minister	of	the	Crown	may	by	regulations	make	such	provision	as	the	Minister	considers
appropriate	to	prevent,	remedy	or	mitigate	(a)	any	failure	of	retained	EU	law	to	operate	effectively,	or
(b)	any	other	deficiency	in	retained	EU	law,	arising	from	the	withdrawal’.
In	effect,	the	Repeal	Bill	proposes	to	delegate	power	to	the	Government	to	create	secondary	legislation	which	will
change,	amend	or	remove	retained	EU-law	on	an	unprecedented	scope	and	scale.	The	White	Paper	envisioned
between	800-1000	statutory	instruments	for	this	purpose,	but	this	is	likely	to	be	an	underestimation	for	a	possible
‘legislative	tsunami’	which	will	arise	to	remedy,	mitigate	or	prevent	deficiencies	under	this	Bill.
A	significant	improvement	on	the	White	Paper	in	terms	of	detail,	the	Bill	outlines	the	sort	of	issues	that	a	minister
can	consider	to	be	deficient.	However,	the	types	of	deficiencies	are	open	to	the	minister’s	interpretation.
One	of	the	most	deeply	concerning	aspects	is	the	estimation	in	the	explanatory	notes	of	the	Repeal	Bill	that	the
rights	of	EU	citizens	could	fall	under	the	category	of	deficiency	to	be	remedied	by	a	Minister.
The	Bill	proposes	that	ministers	will	have	two	years	to	use	this	Henry	VIII	power	to	remedy	or	prevent
deficiencies	arising	by	virtue	of	retained	law.	As	a	time-limit,	it	underestimates	the	scale	and	scope	of	change,
and	as	an	assurance	to	those	sceptical	of	unrestrained	executive	power	to	legislate,	it	offers	little
comfort.	The	limitations	to	be	imposed	on	the	delegated	power	may	be	familiar	to	a	first-year	law	student	reading
about	the	rule	of	law:	ministerial	regulations	may	not	have	retrospective	application,	impose	or	increase	taxes,
create	a	criminal	offence.	They	also	may	not	amend,	repeal	or	revoke	the	Human	Rights	Act	1998	(HRA	1998)	or
any	legislation	under	it	or	amend	the	Northern	Ireland	Act	1998.
There	is,	however,	no	proposed	requirement	on	Government	to	provide	explanation,	justification	or	evaluation	of
the	impact	of	the	changes	made	to	the	law	through	regulations,	nor	does	it	require	assessment	for	impact	on
rights	or	the	rule	of	law.	Ministers	will	decide	the	level	of	Parliamentary	Scrutiny,	and	in	some	limited	cases,
instruments	may	be	made	without	any	draft	being	laid	before	Parliament.	The	proposal	to	make	the	delegated
powers	temporal	and	corrective	does	not	address	the	real	and	concerning	issues	with	unchecked,	broad	and
sweeping	delegated	powers	to	legislate.	potentially	amounting	to	a	designed	lack	of	accountability	within	the	bill.
The	inherent	danger	of	delegated	powers	in	the	form	of	Henry	VIII	clauses	is	the	possibility	of	the	introduction	of
Government	policy	through	secondary	legislation	without	parliamentary	debate,	approval	or	oversight.	A	member
of	either	House	can	call	for	an	instrument	to	be	debated.	However,	the	sheer	volume	of	changes	to	be	made	will
require	a	high	degree	of	vigilance	across	both	Houses	to	ensure	the	use	of	Henry	VIII	powers	does	not	go
unchecked,	thereby	weakening	Parliament.	The	argument	that	judicial	review	can	serve	as	an	adequate
safeguard	to	unchecked	Henry	VIII	power	is	predicated	on	individuals	having	sufficient	legal	knowledge,	capacity
and	resources	to	bring	cases	concerning	the	800-1,000	statutory	instruments	–	though	it	could	still	provoke	a
torrent	of	applications.	The	power	to	amend	all	EU-derived	primary	and	secondary	law	by	Government	without
sufficient	checks	and	controls,	with	little	resource	for	parliamentary	scrutiny	and	oversight,	runs	counter	to	legal
certainty	and	the	rule	of	law,	and	the	ultimate	supremacy	of	Parliament	itself.
A	step	away	from	individual	rights	and	remedies
The	Bill	proposes	that	any	rights,	powers,	liabilities,	obligations,	restrictions,	remedies	and	procedures	which
existed	before	exit	day	are	to	continue	after	exit	day.	However,	like	a	Schrödinger’s	Brexit,	this	is	and	is	not.
This	is	exemplified	in	the	position	of	the	HRA	1998	in	the	Bill.	Stating	that	the	HRA	1998	cannot	be	repealed
under	this	Bill	reads	as	anomalous:	the	HRA	1998	relates	to	the	European	Convention	of	Human	Rights	(ECHR),
and	the	Council	of	Europe	–	not	the	European	Union.	The	HRA	1998	is	independent	of	withdrawal	from	the
European	Union.	It	is	an	Act	of	Parliament	with	quasi-constitutional	status,	and	essential	to	the	Good	Friday
Agreement	of	Northern	Ireland.	To	imply	a	Minister	could	repeal	it	is	dangerous,	to	imply	it	could	be	repealed
under	this	bill	is	absurd.
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The	only	alternative	explanation	of	this	anomaly	of	stating	that	the	HRA	1998	cannot	be	repealed	under	the
Repeal	Bill	may	be	a	way	of	implicitly	reassuring	us	of	the	future	of	human	rights	protection–	at	least	for	the
moment.	If	this	is	the	aim,	it	misses	the	point	entirely.	Under	the	Repeal,	the	EU	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights
will	‘not	be	part	of	the	domestic	law	on	or	after	exit	day’.	The	removal	of	the	effect	of	the	EU	Charter	of
Fundamental	Rights	substantively	weakens	the	protection	of	rights	in	the	UK:	laws	which	violate	Charter	rights
will	no	longer	be	set	aside.
While	it	contains	interpretive	duties,	the	HRA	1998	does	not	provide	equivalent	levels	of	protection	to	the	EU
Charter.	In	the	event	of	an	unavoidable	violation	of	ECHR	rights,	the	Courts	can	only	issue	a	declaration	of
incompatibility	to	Parliament.	This	fits	with	the	larger	attitude	of	immunising	law	and	Government	policy	from
individual	legal	challenge:	the	right	in	Francovich	which	allows	for	damages	in	the	event	of	a	breach	of	EU
obligations	by	the	State	will	end	(Schedule	1,	4).	General	Principles	of	EU	law,	including	recognisably	rule	of	law
principles	and	human	rights,	is	retained	in	domestic	law	(only	if	acknowledged	by	pre-exit	case	law)	but	given	no
right	of	action,	nor	is	any	court	or	tribunal	permitted	to	disapply	any	rule	of	law	or	quash	any	conduct	(Sch	1,	5).
What	this	cumulatively	reflects	is	an	obfuscation	in	what	it	means	to	protect	rights,	and	to	guarantee	individual
liberties	and	the	rule	of	law:	a	right	is	only	a	word	if	it	has	no	remedy.
But	a	step	towards	certainty	and	mutual	trust
Legal	certainty	is	essential	to	a	functional	legal	system,	a	fact	recognised	by	the	bill.	Under	the	Repeal	Bill,	case
law	of	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	EU	decided	before	exit	day	will	have	a	similar	status	to	UK	Supreme	Court
judgments.	After	exit,	courts	are	not	bound	to	the	principles	or	decisions	made	by	the	European	Court	of	Justice,
nor	can	they	refer	any	question	of	interpretation	of	retained	EU	law	to	the	Court.	However,	in	an	ostensible
improvement,	courts	may	have	regard	(if	they	consider	it	appropriate	to	do	so)	to	anything	done	on	or	after	exit
day	by	European	Courts	and	bodies.
A	concern	I	raised	in	my	last	post	is	that	setting	an	‘expiry	date’	on	the	relevance	of	the	European	Court	of	Justice
would	fossilise	the	law:	case	law	will	have	no	relevance	in	cross-border	matters	where	the	law	in	the	EU27	is
subsequently	changed	or	repealed	by	the	EU	legislator,	or	reformed	and	clarified	in	a	subsequent	case	by	the
European	Court.	This	concern	is	prevented,	mitigated	and	remedied	somewhat	by	the	acknowledgment	that	the
retention	of	EU	law,	and	a	future	relationship	with	the	EU,	require	at	least	some	convergence	and	not	divergence
in	the	law.	This	is	a	first	step	towards	recognition	of	the	importance	of	mutual	trust	and	recognition	between	the
UK	and	EU27,	essential	to	cross-border	transactions,	and	judgments	relating	to	families,	consumers	and	security.
In	light	of	the	debate	surrounding	the	relevance	of	the	European	Court	of	Justice,	it	is	a	big	step.
Conclusion
For	a	much-anticipated	Bill,	this	is	unlikely	to	survive	long	in	its	current	form.	For	a	minority	Government	facing
challenge	from	all	sides,	finding	support	will	be	essential.	As	the	ongoing	Euratom	debates	show,	‘gung-ho’
support	for	Brexit	bills	across	the	aisles	is	no	longer	likely,	opposition	parties	have	already	promised	to	treat	the
Repeal	Bill	as	a	‘Christmas	tree’	for	all	the	amendments	to	be	attached	to	it,	as	the	First	Ministers	of	Scotland	and
Wales,	Nicola	Sturgeon	and	Carwyn	Jones,	issued	a	joint	statement	declaring	they	would	withhold	legislative
consent.
The	drafters	of	this	bill	had	a	Herculean	task,	made	no	simpler	by	the	often-contradictory	statements	of	senior
members	of	Government.	‘Brexit	means	Brexit’	has	come	to	be	almost	a	caricature	of	meaning	everything	to
everyone,	all	at	once.	Yet	there	is	also	no	alternative	to	a	Repeal	Bill	if	the	Government	plans	to	deliver	Brexit:	the
ECA	1972	must	be	repealed,	legal	certainty	ought	to	be	guaranteed,	and	an	efficient	mechanism	for	quickly
addressing	issues	which	arise	must	be	framed.	However,	the	expediency	of	the	Henry	VIII	powers	for	Ministers	of
the	Crown	as	currently	framed	to	remedy	and	prevent	‘deficiencies’	in	the	law	arising	from	Brexit	does	not,	and
should	never,	be	to	the	sacrifice	of	individual	rights	and	the	rule	of	law.
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For	the	European	Union	(Withdrawal)	Bill,	it	looks	as	if	nothing	of	substance	has	changed	beyond	dropping	the
honorific	of	‘Great’.	The	concerns	I	have	previously	raised,	mirroring	those	of	the	House	of	Lords,	academics,
judges	and	NGOs,	remain.	In	the	year	since	the	Brexit	referendum,	much	has	happened	–	little	of	it	certain,	but
most	of	it	not	so	(and	no	longer)	all	that	Great.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Joelle	Grogan	is	a	Lecturer	in	Law	at	Middlesex	University.
The	(not	so)	Great	Repeal	Bill,	part	1:	only	uncertainty	is	certain
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